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SEÇÃO ESPECIAL
ABSTRACT
Respeito pelas pessoas 
não autônomas: lidando com 
pacientes com demência
In this text, I address the question what it means to respect patients with demen-
tia. Further, I analyze what appropriate approach to be employed while discussing 
dementia patients, as certain persons. I examine different approaches, such as, the 
autonomy approach, the best interest approach and the approach of the personality 
concept in the strong and weak sense. I argue that the autonomous approach which 
understands patients with dementia as being able to make autonomous decisions, 
asserts the validity of the principle of respecting autonomy. While, the best interest 
approach focuses on the comfort of the patient’s current experience to respect the 
dementia patients. I point out that both the autonomous approach and the best inte-
rest approach are inappropriate for the questions which I engage in this paper. I argue 
and conclude that the personality concept-based approach is appropriate not in the 
sense that patient´s personality is the only important factor (in the strong sense), but 
in the sense that it is an important factor for respect of the dementia patient (in the 
weak sense).
Keywords: Dementia patients; Respect for dementia patients; The principle of respect 
for autonomy; Self-decision; The concept of personality.
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Neste texto, questiono o que significa respeitar pacientes com demência. Além 
disso, analiso qual abordagem apropriada deve ser empregada ao discutir 
pacientes com demência, como determinadas pessoas. Examino abordagens 
diferentes, como a abordagem da autonomia, a abordagem do melhor interesse 
e a abordagem do conceito de personalidade no sentido forte e fraco. Argumento 
que a abordagem autônoma que entende os pacientes com demência como 
capazes de tomar decisões autônomas afirma a validade do princípio de respeitar 
a autonomia. Por outro lado, a abordagem do melhor interesse se concentra 
no conforto da experiência atual do paciente para respeitar os pacientes com 
demência. Assinalo que tanto a abordagem autônoma quanto a de melhor 
interesse são inadequadas para as questões que endereço neste artigo. Argumento 
e concluo que a abordagem baseada no conceito de personalidade é apropriada, 
não no sentido de que a personalidade do paciente é o único fator importante 
(no sentido forte), mas no sentido de que é um fator importante no respeito ao 
paciente com demência (no sentido fraco).
Palavras-chave: Pacientes com demência; Respeito aos pacientes com demência; 
Princípio do respeito à autonomia; Auto-decisão; Conceito de personalidade.
Resumo
It is undisputed that the principle of respect for autonomy is one of 
the most relevant principles in medical ethics. Indeed, this princi-
ple has increasingly gained recognition as a guiding principle in the 
field. A key example is the moral acceptability of euthanasia in the 
sense of letting die,1 which justifies itself largely on the basis of this 
principle.2 This has proved compelling, leading to key changes. One 
such change was Germany’s 2009 legal strengthening of the validity 
of a living will. This can be understood as an expression of the mean-
ingful place that the principle of respect for autonomy receives not 
only in theory, but also in our practical world. Nevertheless, it seems 
clear to me that this principle alone is not sufficient for the explica-
tion of respect for all persons, which in my view can be classified at 
least in two categories: Autonomous persons who are able to make 
an autonomous decision, and non-autonomous persons who cannot 
make an autonomous decision. The principle of respect for autono-
my provides an argument for respect for autonomous persons, but 
not for non-autonomous persons, such as those with dementia in 
1  In the following, the term euthanasia means only the form of letting die. 
2  Cf. BIRNBACHER 2015. 



















































the later stage.3 If we want to understand non-autonomous persons 
as objects of respect as well, a principle different from the principle 
of respect for autonomy is necessary. 
The debate between Ronald Dworkin and Rebecca Dresser about the 
validity of Margo’s living will in the 1990s, which has become some-
thing of a benchmark within this discussion, was the argument over 
the principle of respect for autonomy.4 Since I assume that Margo’s 
living will should be respected as an expression of her autonomy, 
this article basically does not address the controversy. Nevertheless, 
the aforementioned controversy is important for this article because 
Dworkin and Dresser ask the question of how to treat dementia pa-
tients not only as humans but also as a certain individual person. 
They agree that Margo as a dementia patient should be respected, 
even though, according to Dworkin, the experiential interests must 
be subordinated to the critical ones. Taking into account the back-
ground of my starting point, the question raised by Dworkin and 
Dresser can be described as follows.
How can we respect Margo without living will not only as a human 
being, but also as a certain individual person?
To answer this question, it is important to precisely define who 
Margo actually is. The various symptoms of dementia are vari-
able depending on the individual and the progress of the disease. 
If a patient with dementia is understood only in a collective sense, 
it is inappropriate to discuss the issue of respecting a patient with 
dementia. Margo´s assessment and guidance, as Michael Quante 
notes, vary depending on whether she is affected by dementia at an 
early stage or at an advanced stage. 
First, what can be challenging is: In the face of increasing de-
pendency, how do I relate to the attitude and the demands 
which the affected person, who perceives these processes in 
himself, takes and elevates. On the other hand, the question 
is: How can I preserve the dignity of a person who is no lon-
ger aware of his growing dependence? It is obvious that this 
perspective distinction in the different case constellations – 
3  In section 2, I will address the question of why dementia patients in the later stage should not 
be autonomous. 
4  Cf. DWORKIN 1993, pp. 201-202 and DRESSER, 1995.



















































think of progressive dementias, for example – will lead to very 
different assessments and instructions.5
Andrew Firlik describes Margo as follows:
At the apartment, Margo´s Jamaican home attendant, Louise, welcomed 
me with giggles and smiles, […] Before the locks were installed, Margo 
had, on occasion, satisfied her understandable desire to explore the 
city on her own. We usually found her a couple of days later […] Margo 
enjoys reading, especially mysteries, she says, though I´ve noticed that 
her place in the book jumps randomly from day to day; dozens of pages 
are dog-eared at any given moment.6 
The Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences (SAMS) divides dementia 
into three stages.7 Dementia at an early stage is characterized by 
mild cognitive and/or behavioral abnormalities. Daily life is already 
difficult for people with dementia who find themselves in the mid-
dle stages, even if relatives or, in many cases, professionals support 
them. In the severe stage, dementia patients only have minimal ver-
bal communication options, with persisting behavioral disorders and 
emotional disorders. According to these three courses of dementia, 
Margo’s condition can be classified as one of middle dementia. 
In a nod to Margo’s dependency on others, the question is how to 
intervene in Margo’s life. The main question in this article focus-
es on what kind of intervention can be considered respectful to 
Margo. There are four approaches available; the autonomy approach, 
the best interest approach and the approach of the personality con-
cept in the strong and weak sense. On the basis of the dispute over 
Margo´s living will by Dworkin and Dresser, the meaning of respect 
for Margo as a certain individual person should firstly be clarified 
(1). The second section shows whether the principle of respect for 
autonomy can be applied to the main question of this article (2). 
After that, I will briefly mention two types of self-decision: Non-au-
tonomous and autonomous self-decision (3). Subsequently, the va-
lidity of the best interest approach is examined, which is used very 
often in the context of respect for dementia patients (4). In addition, 
the approach of the personality concept should be clarified, which 
can solve the problems of the best interest approach (5). 
5  Cf. QUANTE, 2019, p. 255 [transl. S.S].
6  FIRLIK 1991, p. 201.
7  Cf. SAMS, 2018, p. 8. 



















































1. THE CONSENT OF RESPECT FOR THE  
DEMENTIA PATIENT
Dworkin and Dresser argue over the validity of Margo´s living will. 
While Dworkin claims the validity of her living will, Dresser considers 
it invalid. Nevertheless, there is one commonality between Dworkin 
and Dresser in the debate over the respect of people with dementia. 
These two different conclusions regarding the validity of Margo´s 
living will come from the question from which the experiential and 
critical interests should be prioritized. 
Dworkin understands the interests of a person in two ways: Experi-
ential and critical interests. Experiential interests concern emotive 
pleasures at certain times, which relate to the comforts of each 
experience. Every person can enjoy experiential interests. Because 
“nothing is more natural than any animal’s desire to put itself in the 
way of pleasure and out of the way of pain”.8 On the other hand, crit-
ical interests have to do with how we, as persons, can lead a good 
life. For a good life the more or less coherent integrity of a person is 
necessary, which exists not only at a certain time, but over a period 
of time. Such a person leads a good life in light of his or her own 
values or beliefs. Dworkin is by no means trying to demonstrate that 
only critical interests are important to life, or life that only enjoys 
experiential interests is meaningless. 
Nor am I saying that people who do not consciously reflect on 
how their lives are going as a whole, who just get on with living, 
taking things as they come, are defective or not living well. Lives 
like that can be extremely attractive, even enviable, and they 
are plainly preferable to lives ruined by detailed planning and 
constant trial-balance-sheet assessments of progress.9
But Dworkin points out at the same time that in principle, critical 
interests are more important than experiential interests (general 
priority rule).
If you are a woman with a chance to begin a demanding career 
that intrigues you, but only by sacrificing time with your young 
children, which choice do you make? […] Or, if you are a Jew, 
8  DWORKIN, 1993, p. 203. 
9  DWORKIN 1993, p. 202. 
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should you abandon your comfortable life in Los Angeles and em-
igrate to Israel to identify yourself firmly with that nation’s fate? 
People do not make momentous decisions like these by trying to 
predict how much pleasure each choice might bring them.10 
These decisions, which are not based on experiential interests, show 
the importance of ethical demands on critical interests in our lives. 
Unlike experiential interests, critical interests that require “the abil-
ity to act out of genuine preference or character or conviction or a 
sense of self”11 do not apply to all persons. Persons suffering from 
dementia who lose such abilities due to disease progression have 
experiential interests but not critical interests. In light of the prem-
ise of this article that Margo did not prepare a living will, there is 
no conflict between the two types of interests. It is clear from this 
assumption that the key to respect for dementia patients who do 
not have any critical interests must be experiential interests. In fact, 
Dworkin agrees that 
[…] in the circumstances of dementia, critical interests become 
less important and experiential interests more so, so that 
fiduciaries may rightly ignore the former and concentrate on 
the latter.12
In contrast with Dworkin, Dresser considers Margo’s living will inval-
id. Her criticism of Dworkin boils down to the argument that experi-
ential interest should categorically take precedence.13 According to 
Dresser, the key to respecting Margo is her experiential interest. In 
fact, Dresser and Dworkin disagree over Margo’s living will. Despite 
their disagreement, they see the key to respect for Margo with-
out a living will in the experiential interest. Based on this common 
ground between Dworkin and Dresser, I define respect for dementia 
patients without a living will as the promotion of their experiential 
interests. We can now answer the question of what interventions 
are considered to respect them: Interventions by others that pro-
mote experiential interests can be understood to respect Margo. 
The question therefore is, on what grounds others can promote her 
experiential interests.
10  DWORKIN, 1993, p. 205. 
11  DWORKIN, 1993, p. 224.
12  DWORKIN, 1993, p. 232. 
13  Cf. DRESSER, 1989, p. 158.



















































2. RESPECT FOR AUTONOMY OF DEMENTIA PATIENTS?
Some argue that Margo is still able to make decisions autonomously. 
It follows that the proper basis for promoting Margo’s experiential 
interests lies in the principle of respect for autonomy (2.1). This 
understanding is inconsistent with my understanding of Margo at 
the beginning of this article, being that she is a non-autonomous 
person. Those who regard the principle of respect for autonomy as 
a valid principle in the context of respect for patients with dementia 
are faced with the challenge of demonstrating the systematic 
problem arising from the debate over the moral acceptability of 
euthanasia. By pointing out the systemic problem, I will discuss 
the appropriateness of my understanding that Margo is a non-
autonomous person (2.2). 
2.1 Margo can still make autonomous decisions!
If a person with dementia can still make autonomous decisions, 
the principle of respect for autonomy is the key to respect for 
the patient. However, because a high degree of autonomous 
understanding, such as according to Harry G. Frankfurt, cannot 
be applied to patients with dementia,14 the criteria for autonomy 
need to be lowered. Autonomy is understood as follows: 
Autonomy is gradual and related.15 Decisions made by demented 
patients with the assistance of others such as “the choice of 
food, the clothes and the decision of which activities he/she 
wants to pursue”16 must be understood to be autonomous. I call 
this autonomy concept assisted autonomy. Those who support 
the appropriateness of the principle of respect for autonomy in 
the context of respect for patients with dementia believe that 
this principle enables persons to live a good life. This raises the 
questions: What is a good life? Why is autonomy important for a 
good life? A good life of a person is generally understood in such 
a way that persons lead their lives in their own way. 
14  Cf. FRANKFURT, 1971.
15  Cf. SCHMIDHUBER, 2013, p. 6 and 13ff. NYS 2013, p. 197ff and NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON 
BIOETHICS, 2009, pp. 26-27.
16  SCHMIDHUBER, 2013, p. 6 [transl. S.S]. 
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My life […], from a fundamental point of view, cannot be a 
good life through paternalistic effort. My life can be a good life 
only if I can live my life from the inside according to my beliefs 
and values.17 
In order to live a good life, a person makes decisions based on his 
or her values and beliefs. Advocates of the concept of assisted au-
tonomy acknowledge that in this sense, dementia patients cannot 
live their own lives because of disease progression. According to the 
advocates of the concept of assisted autonomy, dementia patients 
do have their own beliefs and values, such as preferences for food 
and clothing; they simply cannot make decisions based on their own 
values and beliefs. With the assistance of others, they can make de-
cisions based on their values and live their lives in their own way; an 
autonomous decision; a good life. A good life of a person, which is 
understood as living according to his or her own values, is insepara-
ble from autonomy.
However, the model of assisted autonomy faces the question of 
whether this model can really be included in the category of auton-
omy. This is because autonomy originally means self-legislation.18 
Proponents of the model of assisted autonomy address this ques-
tion by emphasizing the relational aspect of autonomy. There are 
many related autonomous concepts, but the proponents of those 
concepts at least agree that
[…] people grow up and live in social relationships, and their 
preferences, attitudes and values are acquired in relationships 
with other people and are therefore subject to social influence.19
Given that a person lives only in relationships with others, the au-
tonomy of a person exists also only in relationships with others. 
By emphasizing the essential element of autonomy, dependence 
on others, the model of assisted autonomy considers decisions 
carried out by others to be autonomous. Importantly, others must 
carry out decisions that are consistent with the personality of the 
person with dementia. Caregivers must therefore read which deci-
sions are consistent with the patients’ personality. The decisions of 
17  RÖSSLER, 2017, p. 394.395 [transl. S.S].
18  Cf. BOBBERT; WERNER, 2014, p. 105. 
19  ACH; SCHÖNE-SEIFERT, 2013, p. 43 [transl. S.S]. 



















































patients with dementia which are not consistently integrated into 
the value system are not always understandable, so that caregivers 
need to interpret their decisions expressed in various forms, such 
as gestures and facial expressions. The proponents of the model 
of assisted autonomy recognize the importance of the concept of 
personality.20 Thus, the autonomy of dementia patients is assured 
through the caregiver finding a decision that is consistent with the 
personality of the dementia patient and executing the decision. 
The following shows that the model of assisted autonomy faces 
systematic problems. 
2.2 Systematic problems of the assisted autonomy concept
A central problem with the model of assisted autonomy is illus-
trated by the discussion of respect for autonomy in the context of 
the moral acceptability of euthanasia, which is divided into letting 
die and killing. Patients’ decisions in letting die, in which patients 
refuse medical treatment, must always be respected, if it is auton-
omous. The reason being, it is not acceptable to enforce medical 
treatment when the patient refuses it autonomously.21 Applying 
this analysis of the relationship between autonomy and respect to 
a model of assisted autonomy raises systematic problems; accord-
ing to this model, caregivers must let patients with dementia un-
der certain conditions die. For example, if a demented patient re-
fuses to take a medicine, the caregiver must follow that decision, 
although it may have been necessary to survive. The decision to 
refuse taking medicine may be consistent with the patient’s per-
sonality, because he or she may have rejected modern medicine 
before getting dementia. As proponents of the assisted autonomy 
model consider it morally problematic to let a patient with de-
mentia under these conditions die, they have the burden of proof 
to explain what it means to respect such a patient. On the one 
hand, if they consider it correct that the patient’s autonomy to 
letting die must be always respected, they must explain why the 
autonomy of the dementia patient to refuse to take a medicine is 
not respected. The autonomy in the sense that the patient does 
20  Cf. MCCORMACK, 2002, p. 117 and NYS, 2013, p. 197.
21  Cf. World Medical Association, Declaration of Lisbon on the Right of the Patient. Online: 
http://dl.med.or.jp/dl-med/wma/lisbon_e.pdf [27.07.2019]. 



















































not give consent in the interference is understood in two senses; 
autonomy that must be respected (refusal of medical treatment: 
letting die) and autonomy of patients with dementia that must 
not be respected (refusal of taking a medicine: letting die). As long 
as advocates of the assisted autonomy model support the above 
thesis that autonomy is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
respecting the decision of euthanasia (letting die), they cannot 
fulfil the required burden of proof. On the other hand, if propo-
nents of the assisted autonomy model do not accept the thesis 
that the patient’s decision to euthanize (letting die) must be re-
spected as long as it is autonomous, then they bear the burden of 
proof as to why it is allowed to intervene in a patients’ autonomy 
as a denial of consent. It seems to me that it is impossible to fulfill 
this burden of proof. Given this problem, it is not appropriate to 
consider Margo’s decisions autonomous. We should then regard 
Margo as a person who cannot make autonomous decisions.
3. TWO DIFFERENT FORMS OF  
SELF-DECISION: AUTONOMOUS AND  
NON-AUTONOMOUS SELF-DECISION
The fundamental question of this article emerges again from previ-
ous discussions; on what basis can others promote the experiential 
interests of dementia persons. In other words: How can we respect 
Margo? The essential problem with the model of assisted auton-
omy is that it considers self-decision of patients with dementia to 
be autonomous. To avoid the problem of the assisted autonomy 
model, self-decision should be distinguished from autonomy. 
In fact, many bioethicists understand autonomy and self-decision as 
synonyms.22 But the concepts of autonomy and self-decision can be 
distinguished. To make this clear, one can ask whether a demented 
person can still decide to eat meat or fish or to drink a glass of water 
or a cup of coffee. The patient can definitely make such decisions. 
Although these decisions are a form of self-decision, they must not 
be considered autonomous. In other words, self-decision can be di-
vided into two forms.
22  Cf. BROCK, 2013, p. 264, HOLM, 2001, p. 154 and ELLIOT 2012, p. 543. 
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1. Self-decision associated with autonomy (autonomous 
self-decision)
2. Self-decision not associated with autonomy (non-autonomous 
self-decision)
The patient´s autonomous decision, on the one hand, is themat-
ic in the context of withholding medical treatment. As long as the 
patient´s self-decision from the physician’s point of view is autono-
mous, physician intervention in the patient´s autonomous self-de-
cision is not permitted. The practice of medical treatment that pa-
tients autonomously refuse is morally unacceptable. I call respect 
for autonomous self-decision in this sense a negative respect for 
autonomous self-decision. Autonomous self-decision of the patients 
is necessary and sufficient to respect it in a negative sense. Unlike 
autonomous self-decision, physician intervention in a patient´s 
non-autonomous self-decision is morally acceptable under certain 
conditions. For example, if a patient with dementia refuses the nec-
essary care without understanding, caregivers may be allowed to 
intervene in the patient´s self-decision. 
A patient’s non-autonomous self-decision is neither sufficient nor 
necessary in a negative respect for autonomous self-decision. It is 
therefore not subject to the argument of respecting autonomous 
self-decision. However, as long as non-autonomous self-decision 
is a form of self-decision, it does not mean that non-autonomous 
self-decision is not respected in any case. Self-decision itself is nor-
mative, so even non-autonomous self-decision is subject to respect. 
Given the systematic problem of the assisted autonomy model, the 
key to respecting patients with dementia should be found in non-au-
tonomous self-decision rather than in autonomous self-decision. 
Caregivers should rely on the patient’s non-autonomous self-deci-
sion to promote their own experiential interests. This avoids contra-
dictory situations in which the assisted autonomy model fails. 
At the same time, however, it is clear that not all non-autonomous 
self-decisions can promote the experiential interests of patients 
with dementia, namely respect for them. Caregivers must therefore 
interpret which non-autonomous self-decision of dementia patients 
promotes their experiential interests. The question then is, which 



















































approach is appropriate for that purpose. There are three possible 
approaches: The approach oriented to the best interests of patients 
with dementia and the approaches oriented to the personality of 
patients with dementia in the strong and weak sense. According 
to the best approach, as shown below, patients with dementia are 
respected when the caregivers promote their experiential interests 
based on the patient´s point of view and the synchronic perspective. 
According to the personality approach in the strong sense, patients 
with dementia are respected when the caregivers promote their ex-
periential interests based on the patient´s and others´ point of view 
and the diachronic perspective. This approach assumes that care 
that aims to match personality and non-autonomous self-decision 
promotes experiential interests. Finally, according to the personality 
approach in the weak sense, patients with dementia are respect-
ed when the caregivers uphold their experiential interests based 
on the patient´s and others´ point of view and the synchronic, dia-
chronic perspective. Unlike the personality approach in the strong 
sense, this approach does not make the assumption that only care 
that aims to match personality and non-autonomous self-decision 
promotes experiential interests. In the case of the personality ap-
proach in the weak sense, it is an open question whether care seeks 
to match personality and non-autonomous self-decision.
4. THE MEANING OF RESPECT FOR THE DEMENTIA 
PATIENT: THE BEST INTEREST APPROACH OF THE 
DEMENTIA PATIENT
4.1 The best interest approach
The best approach is aimed exclusively at the well-being of patients 
with dementia, where the personality of the patient should not be 
considered. This approach relies on the thesis that there is numeri-
cal identity before and after dementia but no personal identity: »de-
mented patients are not, in some sense, the same persons they were 
before«.23 Personal identity, which generally goes back to John Locke, 
is one of the fundamental philosophical questions. The thesis of the 
23  ELLIOTT, 2012, p. 544.



















































best approach that there is no personal identity is actually based on 
his argument. Personal identity, according to Locke, extends into the 
continuing past of first-person memory. According to it, there is no 
personal identity between me in the present and me when I was three 
years old. The required condition for personal identity – the continu-
ity of first-person memory at two different times and points – is not 
satisfied here. Based on Locke´s personal identity theory, advocates 
of the best-interest approach point out that the personality before 
dementia cannot be attributed to the dementia patient. 
The neurological damage associated with their condition 
destroys memory and the associated sense of oneself as 
persisting through time, as well as affecting intellectual capacity, 
personality and values.24 
The best interest approach that the personality before dementia has 
nothing to do with the demented person has two consequences; it 
eliminates the perspective of others and focuses only on the syn-
chronic perspective. We think generally that relatives are very im-
portant for dementia patients and their opinions are also important 
for care planning. Relatives are regarded as the people who know 
best how the person lived and what he or she liked before becom-
ing demented. But the best interest approach does not recognize 
relatives´ advantage in the context of care. According to the best 
interest approach, relatives know the person before dementia, not 
the demented patient who has nothing to do with that person. Their 
opinions are not helpful in caring for people with dementia. In ad-
dition, the best interest approach not only considers it impossible 
to bring the personality of the previous personality into the care 
debate, but also considers it morally inappropriate. Care aimed at 
matching personality and non-autonomous self-decisions can be 
problematic for dementia persons themselves.
If the well-known polar explorer and adventurer Sir Ranulph 
Fienness […] became demented and wanted to go out into a 
blizzard, there would be an excellent connection between this 
desire and his previous stable personality; but would not be 
equally justified in discounting this wish […].25
24  MCDOUGALL, 2005, p. 39.
25  HOLM, 2001, p. 156. 
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Dementia patients are not interested in whether non-autonomous 
self-decision is consistent with their personality, but only in wheth-
er their every experience is comfortable. Their interests are not di-
rected to the future, but are limited to the present. Unlike a per-
son who can make autonomous decisions, the past and the future 
have no role in respecting people with dementia. According to the 
best interest approach, respect for patients with dementia lies not 
in the coincidence of non-autonomous self-decision and personali-
ty, but in the aim of comfort with current experiences. The funda-
mental problem with the best interest approach, as we see below, is 
that it is based on Locke’s personal identity theory, which relies on 
first-person memory. 
4.2 The fundamental problem of the best interest approach
In this section, I would like to examine whether personal identity can 
be derived only from first-person memory. Locke’s theory of person-
al identity has had a profound impact on us to this day.26 He posit-
ed that ones’ personal identity could be extracted from first-person 
memory. According to Locke, there is no personal identity between 
individuals who fail to conceive of themselves as themselves at dif-
ferent times and places based on first-person memory. But ones’ 
personal identity cannot be derived solely from first-person mem-
ory, which is fallible and also cannot correct memory errors. For 
example, we cannot merely determine from a first-person memory 
whether a mental episode, such as eating sushi a week ago, really 
happened or was a déjà vu moment. Therefore, it is insufficient to 
extract personal identity from first-person memory alone.27 
4.3 Two problems regarding the two consequences of the best 
interest approach
The two consequences of the best interest approach – removing 
the perspective of others and focusing only on the present – can be 
ethically problematic, especially in respect to patients with demen-
tia. It is clear that understanding from the patient’s current point 
26  Cf. LOCKE, 1975. 
27  Cf. QUANTE, 2007, p. 50 ff.



















































of view which non-autonomous self-decision promotes the expe-
riential interests of demented patients is essential for respecting 
them. As mentioned in section 2, it is widely accepted that the im-
plementation of medical practices that a patient has autonomously 
rejected is considered unacceptable paternalism, even if necessary 
for life-saving. However, this approach cannot be applied to patients 
with dementia who cannot make an autonomous decision. Thus, 
paternalism, such as forced feeding or restraint, may be morally jus-
tified in such patients.28 Even if paternalism can be morally justified 
under certain circumstances, it cannot be understood as a respect 
for patients with dementia as defined in section 1 as the promotion 
of experiential interests. It is relevant to determine which non-au-
tonomous self-decision promote experiential interests based on the 
patient´s current perspective. 
Nevertheless, the view of others cannot be ignored from two stand-
points. The exclusion of the perspective of others, on the one hand, 
makes it impossible to properly understand the meaning of respect-
ing patients with dementia. As long as the support of others plays 
an essential role in respecting them, we cannot exclude the perspec-
tive of others.29 Respect for patients with dementia which excludes 
the perspective of others is insufficient in itself. The exclusion of 
the perspective of others, on the other hand, leads to problemat-
ic consequences. This is especially noticeable if the caregiver is not 
convinced of the care plan. Being forced to provide unsatisfactory 
care increases the risk of caregiver burnout, which is problematic 
not only for the caregivers, but also for the dementia patients them-
selves. For these two reasons, the perspective of others should not 
and cannot be overlooked in the discussion of respect for patients 
with dementia.
In order to solve these two problems – the exclusion of the perspec-
tive of others and focusing only on the synchronic perspective – it 
is necessary to consider the viewpoint of others and the diachronic 
perspective. As will be seen below, the concept of personality plays 
an important role in solving these two problems. 
28  Cf. KNELL, 2018, p. 63. 
29  Cf. MCCORMACK, 2002, p. 117. 



















































5. THE MEANING OF RESPECT FOR THE PERSON WITH 
DEMENTIA: THE CONCEPT OF PERSONALITY
First, this section will clarify why the concept of personality can 
contribute in solving the two problems in the best interest ap-
proach. At this point, it is important to understand the content 
of the personality concept (5.1). Finally, the validity of the per-
sonality concept approach in respecting people with dementia is 
verified (5.2).
5.1 The concept of personality
Personhood is the condition for being a person. When a human be-
ing fulfils the conditions for being a person, they are regarded as a 
person and as a bearer of the moral status attributed equally to all 
persons. If action A is morally unacceptable for person A, it should 
be also morally unacceptable for person B. For example, if the act of 
killing is understood as a morally unacceptable act for one person, it 
is also deemed to be unacceptable for another. In the dimension of 
personhood, it is not possible to elicit the difference in moral status 
between persons. However, the ethical requirements of a person are 
highly variable, depending on the individual and the circumstances 
of the individual. Referring to the euthanasia discussion, it is easy to 
see that a person suffering from an incurable disease may wish to 
die, while others do not. This makes it clear that the dimension of 
personhood does not adequately capture the ethical requirements 
of persons. 
Unlike personhood, the concept of personality is generally charac-
terized by the individual characteristic of the person. Persons build 
their own personalities over time in their interactions with others.30 
Relationships with others and diachronic perspective are, therefore, 
components of ones’ personality. If the concept of personality in a 
strong or weak sense is the key to respecting a patient with demen-
tia, two problems of best interest approach – the exclusion of the 
perspective of others and focusing only on the synchronic perspec-
tive – can be eliminated. 
30  Cf. QUANTE, 2007.
If the concept of 
personality in a 
strong or weak 
sense is the key 
to respecting 
a patient with 
dementia, two 
problems of best 
interest approach 
– the exclusion of 
the perspective 
of others and 
focusing only on 
the synchronic 
perspective – can 
be eliminated. 



















































5.2 The concept of personality in a strong and weak sense for 
respect of the dementia patient
However, if the application of the personality concept regarding the 
question of respect for patients with dementia brings new prob-
lems, then the approach of the personality concept as a whole is 
not suitable. According to the best interest approach, the concept of 
personality is in this context in principle not suitable. The question 
here is whether the concept of personality is in principle inappropri-
ate for the argument about respect for patients with dementia. The 
approach of the personality concept responds to this question in 
both a strong and weak sense. 
Proponents of the personality concept approach understand this 
position only in a strong sense. The respect for dementia patients 
occurs in the caregiver caring for a demented patient according 
to his or her non-autonomous self-decision, which is consistent 
with his or her personality. The personality approach in a strong 
sense argues that the correspondence of non-autonomous 
self-decision and personality promotes the experiential interests 
of dementia patients.31 The concept of personality is in this sense 
the key to respect for them. The best interest approach objects 
to the claim that non-autonomous self-decision, which does not 
match the personality but its promotion of experiential interests, 
is not considered. 
In addition to the personality approach in a strong sense, there 
is in my opinion the personality approach in a weak sense, which 
does not assume that the correspondence between non-autono-
mous self-decision and personality is the only important factor in 
respecting people with dementia. The concept of personality can 
sometimes be very helpful for caregivers to interpret which non-au-
tonomous self-decision is in the patient´s experiential interests. Re-
gardless of theoretical differences – the best interest approach or 
the personality approach in a strong and weak sense – all bioeth-
icists who deal with the question about respect for persons with 
dementia agree, that the way dementia patients express their own 
decisions is not always understandable. It remains unclear in most 
cases which non-autonomous-self-decision promotes their experi-
31  Cf. FORD; MCCORMACK, 2000, p. 42 and Heliker 1999, p. 514. 



















































ential interests. Under this assumption, which is shared by all ap-
proaches, all available sources should be used to get to know the 
dementia patients. By knowing the patient with dementia, caregiv-
ers can sometimes better interpret which non-autonomous self-de-
cisions promote their experiential interests.
Without taking into account biographical backgrounds, the 
needs of people with dementia often go unrecognized or 
misinterpreted, which is a threat or reduction in their subjective 
well-being.32
The concept of personality approach in a weak sense is a time-con-
suming task, when it is deemed important for this approach to know 
the personality of the dementia patients. This usually requires time 
and, in addition, co-operation with relevant people (relatives and 
caregivers and so on) is necessary. It should be emphasized at this 
point that the concept of personality approach in a weak sense does 
not reject in principle the position of the personality approach in 
the strong sense as inappropriate. Because the correspondence of 
non-autonomous self-decision and personality can be important for 
respect towards the person suffering from dementia. The person-
ality approach in a weak sense recognizes this correspondence of 
non-autonomous self-decision as possibly adequate in respect for it, 
but not as sufficient. The non-autonomous self-decision, which does 
not correspond to personality, but promotes the experiential inter-
est, can also be considered within the framework of the approach of 
the concept of personality in a weak sense. 
The approach of the concept of personality in a weak sense can con-
tribute to the promotion of the experiential interests of the person 
with dementia, so that the concept of the personality is therefore 
not considered in principle unsuitable for the respect of the patient. 
If someone wants to persist in the opposite position, the dispens-
ability of the perspective of others and the diachronic perspective 
must be justified. But this burden of proof, as we saw, cannot be 
fulfilled. Approaches that ignore these two perspectives are further-
more inadequate from an empirical point of view. Shimada express-
ly points out the importance of others. 
32  BERENDONK; STANEK; SCHÖNIT; KASPAR; BÄR; KRUSE 2011, S. 13 [transl. S.S].
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It is not uncommon for care managers to make offers to family 
caregivers to keep the person with dementia longer in the 
facility if caregivers have the impression that the relatives are 
overwhelmed by the care.33
The relatives are immediately important for the person suffering 
from dementia in the sense that they take over the care work. The 
care facility is important for the relatives who take care of the per-
son with dementia in the sense that it can reduce their burden of 
nursing care in a variety of ways, such as counseling, day care, am-
bulatory care, and so on. 
CONCLUSION 
Thus, it is not autonomous self-decision, but non-autonomous 
self-decision that is the key to promoting the experiential interests 
of persons with dementia. However, as not every non-autonomous 
self-decision promotes their experiential interests, caregivers must 
interpret which non-autonomous self-decision contributes to it. In 
view of the differentiated symptoms of dementia, it seems to me 
neither possible nor appropriate to seek the criterion of universal 
validity. It should be verified on a case-by-case basis with regard 
to the individual personality of the dementia patient. It cannot be 
overlooked that the relation of non-autonomous self-decision with 
the promotion of experiential interests can only be answered in-
adequately, either from the synchronous perspective or from the 
diachronic perspective. Moreover, this is not the pure problem 
of either the dementia sufferer or the other. The cooperation be-
tween all concerned (dementia patient, caregivers, relatives and 
care facility, and so on), from both the synchronous and the dia-
chronic perspectives, enable us to find out which non-autonomous 
self-decision of the person with dementia would best further their 
experiential interests. As a result, patients with dementia are re-
spected as particular individual persons. 
33  KUROKI; LEWERICH; SHIMADA, 2018, S. 88 [transl. S.S].
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